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ARGUMENT 
I. VISIBLE WORK COMMENCED AND MATERIALS WERE FURNISHED 
ON THE PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF THE ZION'S 
TRUST DEED ON JUNE 15, 2001 
The trial court's findings of no visible commencement of work or furnishing of 
materials are clearly erroneous. Substantial record evidence establishes that, contrary to 
the trial court's findings, prior to the recording of the Zion's Trust Deed on June 15, 
2001, visible work was commenced on the Property, and materials were furnished, as 
required for priority purposes under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5. 
A. Visible Work Commenced on the Property Prior to June 15, 2001 
EDSA's lien is entitled to priority pursuant to § 38-1-5 because visible work 
commenced on the Property prior to the recording of the Zion's Trust Deed on June 15, 
2001. Both Klibanoff and the trial court have erroneously focused on evidence that no 
actual construction occurred prior to June 15, 2001-evidence which is irrelevant because 
under Utah law, work preparatory to construction can be sufficient to satisfy the "visible 
commencement of work" standard. In this case, substantial record evidence establishes 
that visible preparatory work commenced on the Property prior to June 15, 2001. 
1. Preparatory Work Is Sufficient To Establish Visible 
Commencement of Work Under § 38-1-5 
Despite Klibanoff s assertions to the contrary, Utah law is clear that preparatory 
work can be sufficient to establish visible commencement of work for priority purposes 
under § 38-1-5. As this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have repeatedly explained, the 
requirement that there be "commencement to do work" is construed broadly, in favor of 
the lien claimant. See, e.g. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982); 
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Ketchum v. Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); see also Sill v. Hart, 2007 
UT 45 f 8, 162 P.3d 1099 (stating that the purpose of the Utah mechanics' lien statute 
"manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor and furnish 
the materials which enter into the construction of the building or other improvement. 
Lien status should be broadly construed to effectuate that purpose"). 
As part of this liberal construction in favor of lien claimants, both this Court and 
the Utah Supreme Court have expressly held that work preparatory to construction can be 
sufficient "commencement of work" to establish priority under § 38-1-5. For example, in 
Western Mortgage, the Utah Supreme Court explained, "The presence of materials on the 
building site or evidence on the ground that work has commenced on a structure or 
preparatory thereto is notice to the world that liens may have attached." Western Mtg. 
Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 424 P.2d 437, 439 (Utah 1967); see First of 
Denver Mtg. Investors v. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521, 525-26 (Utah 1979) (same). 
In fact, in this very case, this Court noted and rejected the argument that actual 
construction is required in order to establish a visible commencement of work. This 
Court stated, 
Klibanoff presented evidence that actual construction of the structures had not 
commenced prior to the recording of the deed. However, since such construction is 
not required to establish priority for mechanics' liens, that evidence is not 
determinative. 
EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. Klibanoff, 2005 UT App. 367, ^  4 n.l, 122 P.3d 646. Relying on 
the Utah Supreme Court's decisions in Western Mortgage and Zundel, this Court 
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concluded that actual construction is "not required to establish priority" and that work 
"preparatory" to construction can constitute visible commencement of work. Id, 
Despite this clear language from both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, 
Klibanoff inexplicably continues to argue that "preparatory activities are not enough" and 
that the work must be "clearly part of a building or improvement" and must give "notice 
that construction has commenced." Klibanoff Br. at 17, 19. Understandably, Klibanoff 
can find no Utah authority in support of this position and relies exclusively on foreign 
authority from the Arkansas Supreme Court, the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Southern 
District of Iowa, and the District of Utah. See Klibanoff Br. at 17-21. Klibanoff s 
argument, as well as the authority on which he relies, is inconsistent with Utah law.1 
In fact, the only Utah authority Klibanoff even mentions here are this Court's 
opinions in Klibanoff and Ketchum, which both support the principle that preparatory 
work can be sufficient under § 38-1-5. Compare Klibanoff Br. at 17-21 with Klibanoff 
2005 UT App at IHf 4 n.l, 29 (distinguishing Ketchum). 
1
 The foreign authority relied on by Klibanoff should be disregarded not only 
because it directly contradicts clear Utah authority, but also because relying on foreign 
authority to determine priority and commencement of work under the Utah mechanics' 
lien statute is especially problematic. Courts and commentators have recognized the 
limited utility for any state to refer to the law of foreign jurisdictions to make 
determinations under a specific state's mechanics' lien statute. See, e.g. 53 Am. Jur. 2d 
Mechanics' Liens § 7 (explaining that "[t]he diversity in the mechanic's lien laws of the 
various states diminishes, and may often nullify, the value of a decision from one state as 
a precedent in another"); Uniform Construction Lien Act of 1987, Prefatory Note 
(explaining that "[a]ll states presently have mechanic's lien laws" but they are 
"extraordinarily varied [in] approach, in substance, and in language to the issues involved 
in mechanics' lien legislation" such that "variation among the states may be greater in this 
area than in any other statutory area"). 
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Because preparatory work can be sufficient under § 38-1-5, the standard in Utah is 
not whether the visible work gives notice that "construction has commenced," as 
Klibanoff argues, see Klibanoff Br. at 17; rather, the standard is whether the visible work 
gives notice that "lienable work is underway." Klibanoff, 2005 UT App at f 21 
(emphasis added); see Nu-TrendElec., Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Savs. Loan Assn., 786 P.2d 
1369, 1371 (Utah App. 1990) (same); Ketchum, 784 P.2d at 1221 (same). Lienable work, 
in turn, is broadly defined to include "all persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (emphasis added). Thus the work on the property 
must give notice that lienable work-which includes "improvement to any premises in any 
manner"- is underway. There is simply no requirement that the visible commencement of 
work under § 38-1-5 be limited to the actual construction of a structure or improvement. 
In fact, such a requirement would be contrary to the plain language of Utah's 
mechanics' lien statute, which states, 
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of 
the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure 
or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other 
encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time when the 
building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or first 
material furnished on the ground . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (emphasis added). This language indicates that there are three 
ways to establish priority over subsequent liens or encumbrances: (1) commencing the 
actual construction of the building, improvement or structure, (2) beginning other work 
on the property, or (3) furnishing materials on the ground. See Homeside Lending, Inc. v. 
4 
Miller, 2001 UT App. 247, U 25, 31 P.3d 607 (stating that a court must look "first to the 
plain language of the statute . .. and assume that each term was used advisedly by the 
legislature"); John Holmes Constr. v. RA McKell Excavating , 2005 UT 83, \ 12, 131 
P.3d 199 (same). To interpret § 38-1-5 to mean that the visible commencement of work 
can only include the actual construction of a structure or improvement would eviscerate 
the meaning of the separate "work begun" language. 
Thus, in Utah, the visible commencement of work must simply provide notice of 
lienable work being performed on the property, not notice of actual construction, and as a 
result, preparatory work can be sufficient for priority purposes under § 3 8-1-5.2 
2. Here, The Preparatory Work Gave Notice to a Reasonable 
Lender That Lienable Work Was Being Performed 
EDSA presented evidence at trial, and marshals evidence on appeal, establishing 
that the preparatory work performed prior to the recording of the Zion's Trust Deed gave 
notice to any reasonably prudent lender that lienable work was being performed on the 
Property. See Klibanoff, 2005 UT App at ^  29. 
Although Klibanoff argues in response that the preparatory work performed here is 
not the "type of activity" which should qualify as visible commencement of work, see 
Klibanoff Br. at 20-21, Klibanoff again relies on foreign authority for support. See 
2
 EDSA is at a loss as to why Klibanoff devotes almost an entire page of his Brief 
to establishing that off-site work cannot constitute visible commencement of work under 
§ 38-1-5. See Klibanoff Br. at 21-22. EDSA clearly recognized in its Brief that under 
Ketchum, off-site preparatory work is insufficient, see EDSA Br. at 34, and EDSA never 
once argued in its Brief that any off-site work performed on the project constituted visible 
commencement of work under § 38-1-5. All of the evidence on which EDSA relied at 
trial, and on which it relies on appeal, is preparatory work which was performed on the 
Property itself. See EDSA Br. at 5-9, 12-33. 
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Klibanoff Br. at 20-21 (relying on cases from the Arkansas Supreme Court, the Michigan 
Court of Appeals, and the District of Utah). Because these foreign authorities all 
contradict clear Utah law by holding that preparatory work can never constitute 
commencement of work for priority purposes,3 these cases necessarily exclude many 
types of work which would constitute visible commencement of work in Utah, and thus 
are completely irrelevant and inapplicable. 
The only Utah case on which Klibanoff relies is Ketchum, which he cites for the 
proposition that surveying, staking, and soil testing can never constitute the visible 
commencement of work. See Klibanoff Br. at 17, 20. This Court distinguished Ketchum 
in Klibanoff, however, and explained that Ketchum actually stands for the more limited 
proposition that surveying, staking, and soil testing, "standing alone," would not 
constitute commencement of work. Klibanoff 2005 UT App. at j^ 29 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, as this Court recognized, Ketchum does not mean that EDSA's 
evidence of surveying, staking, and soil testing is irrelevant under § 38-1-5. Instead, 
where, as here, there is additional evidence of visible commencement of work, evidence 
of surveying, staking, and soil testing "may contribute to putting a 'reasonable observer . . 
. on notice that [lienable] work was underway.'" Id. (quotation omitted). 
3
 See Clark v. Gen. Elec. Co., 420 S.W.2d 830, 833-834 (Ark. 1967) (stating that 
preparation of the land for construction is not sufficient); Portage Realty Corp. v. Baas, 
298 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting the Michigan mechanics' lien 
statute, which requires "commencement of said building or buildings, erection, structure, 
or improvement"); E. W. Allen & Assoc, v. FDIC, 776 F. Supp. 1504, 1509 (D. Utah 1991) 
(stating that preparatory work cannot constitute visible commencement of work). 
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Notably, this Court also indicated in Klibanoffthat Ketchum might have reached a 
different result had the surveying, staking, and soil testing in that case been "sufficiently 
noticeable or related to actual construction."4 Id. at fflf 29-30. 
Read together, Ketchum and Klibanoffmem that the surveying, staking, and soil 
testing performed on the Property prior to June 15, 2001 is relevant evidence of the 
"commencement of work," both because it should be considered in conjunction with the 
additional work performed during this time frame (including the establishment of control 
points, drainage improvements, wetlands delineations, groundwater monitoring, and the 
installation of a weir), and because the surveying, staking, and soil testing here, unlike the 
work performed in Ketchum, was sufficiently noticeable and related to construction. 
3. The Preparatory Work Performed on the Property Was Visible 
and Related to Construction 
Here, the preparatory work performed on the Property prior to the recording of the 
Zion's Trust Deed on June 15, 2001 included not only surveying, staking, and soil testing 
4
 This Court's clarification is supported by the fact that Ketchum relied in large 
part on Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1987). See Ketchum, 784 P.2d at 
1227. Although the staking performed in Tripp appears to have been, at best, minimal 
staking of the property boundaries, the Court did not hold that it was insufficient as a 
matter of law to constitute commencement of work under § 38-1-5. See Tripp, 141 P.2d at 
1055. Rather, the Court upheld the trial court's finding of fact that the staking had been 
insufficient to put a prudent lender on notice of lienable work. Id. The Court in Tripp 
explained, "From the evidence submitted, the survey stakes were not sufficiently 
noticeable or related to actual construction to impart notice to a prudent lender." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In any event, the facts in Ketchum are vastly different from those here. In 
Ketchum, the surveying and staking was performed for a ski resort on a 4,651 acre 
property. See Ketchum, 784 P.2d at 1219. Certainly what may be visible to a reasonably 
diligent observer on a 4,651 acre property would be different from what would be visible 
on the property at issue here, where extensive staking took place on a 13-acre parcel. 
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but also the establishment of control points, drainage improvements, wetlands 
delineations, groundwater monitoring, and the installation of a weir. Thus, as this Court 
clearly instructed in KHbanoff, "[Ejven though staking, surveying, and soil testing alone 
would not constitute visible commencement of work, when considering all of the work 
together, they may contribute to putting a 'reasonable observer . . . on notice that 
[Henable] work was underway.'" KHbanoff 2005 UT App. at \ 29 (quotation omitted & 
emphasis added); cf KHbanoff Br. at 25 (asserting, despite this Court's clear language in 
KHbanoff that the Court should not use a "totality of the circumstances" standard and 
should not "consider all of the activities that occurred on the Property together").5 
All of this work on the Property was both visible and related to construction, 
therefore it provided notice to a prudent lender that Henable work was underway and was 
sufficient to establish priority under § 38-1-5. 
a. The surveys and staking, as well as the marking of control 
points, were visible and related to construction. 
Both the boundary and topographical surveys, and the staking related thereto, were 
visible and related to construction. Stahl performed the topographical and boundary 
surveys in December 2000 and April 2001. R.3179 at 612-613, 621-622, 624. The 
5
 Whether or not a reasonable observer of the site would be on notice that Henable 
work was underway cannot be determined by parsing out each individual item of work 
rather than looking at the totality of the work done and the collective visible evidence of 
work on the site. Indeed, other Utah courts have analyzed whether visible work was 
performed by reviewing as a whole all of the work done prior to the recording of the 
competing encumbrance. For example, in Calder Brothers, the Utah Supreme Court 
examined all of the work together and concluded that ample evidence supported the trial 
court's finding that work had not commenced. Calder Bros., 652 P.2d at 924-25. 
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surveys were directly related to construction. Because the Property is on a slope, the 
designers needed a topographical survey in order to determine the grades and elevations 
of the roads and buildings for the development. R.3179 at 289-290. The topographical 
survey would also reflect all the features on the project, including surface undulations for 
topography, improvements, homes, trees, and the wetlands delineation. R.3179 at 611. 
More importantly, Stahl's work went beyond mere surveying. Stahl actually 
prepared the land for construction because in addition to creating the topographical 
survey plat map and staking the Property boundaries, Stahl also established four to five 
control points for the development. R.3179 at 615-616. These control points were 
absolutely essential to the project because everything that is built and designed relates to 
the control point. R.3179 at 618-620. In fact, the control points were as important if not 
more important than the staking of the building corners because the control points would 
ultimately control the location of all the improvements on the Property. R.3179 at 323-
324, 620. There were more control points than there would normally have been for a 
mere boundary survey, and the control points were permanent and set for construction. 
R.3179at642. 
Both the survey stakes and the control points were visible. The survey stakes were 
three feet tall, R.3179 at 301, and the Property corners were marked with a fluorescent 
orange lath with fluorescent flagging. R.3179 at 294, 300, 620-621. The control points 
were marked with 5/8 inch rebar covered in a bright yellow plastic cap, an 18-inch tall 
flagged guard stake, and at least one three-foot tall orange fluorescent lath with 
fluorescent flagging. R.3179 at 299-300, 323-324, 618-19. 
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Multiple witnesses, including Safley, Forrest, Stahl, Cloward, and Hayward, 
testified at trial that the survey stakes and control points were visible, not only to someone 
inspecting the Property, but also from several of the roads bordering the Property. See 
R.3179 at 300-301 (Safley); R.3177 at 116 (Forrest); R.3179 at 619-621 (Stahl); R.3179 
at 674 (Cloward); R.3177 at 251-252, 257-259 (Hayward). 
b. The geotechnical study was visible and related to 
construction. 
The geotechnical study was visible and related to construction. The geotechnical 
study was conducted in January 2001. R.3179 at 568-569. As the trial court noted, the 
purpose of the study was to test the soils in order to determine the bearing capacity of the 
soil and thus determine how big the footings and foundations of the buildings should be. 
R.2894 at 10 f 56. The geotechnical study also revealed groundwater levels and whether 
there was pot rock or cavities that needed to be avoided in construction, and thus, it was 
directly related to construction. R.3179 at 292, 297-298, 330, 585. 
The work performed in the geotechnical study was visible. Although the eight 
testing holes were backfilled, the geotechnical study required the use of a large drilling 
rig. R.3179 at 572-574; R.3179 at 295-297. Larson and a two-man crew drilled the test 
holes, and each testing hole was 16.5 feet below the surface and took 30-45 minutes to 
drill. Id. Safley testified that the drilling rig, which was on the Property for an entire day, 
was a "big" piece of equipment. R.3179 at 295-297; see R.3179 at 571, 578. 
c. The drainage improvements were visible and related to 
construction. 
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The drainage improvements were visible and related to construction. A surface 
water problem directly affected Red Sea's ability to build the proposed development on 
the Property. R.3179 at 291, 302-303, 307, 389, 671. This surface water problem 
exacerbated the groundwater problem, R.3179 at 629, distorted the wetlands delineation, 
R.3179 at 389-392, and flooded the Property to the extent it was essentially impossible to 
build on the Property. R.3179 at 307, 502; R.3181 at 693; R.3177 at 143, 289. Because 
the drainage improvements were important to the engineering design of the Property, 
EDS A supervised Chiniquy's work, including supervising and directing the removal of 
the old pipe, the excavation of the trench, and the replacement of the new pipe. R.3179 at 
310; R.3181 at 692, 696-697. 
The drainage improvements were visible. The drainage improvements required the 
excavation with a backhoe of a 50-foot long trench that tapered from eight feet deep to 
several feet deep. R.3179 at 510, 513. Chiniquy installed 40 feet of new 15-inch PVC 
pipe, R.3179 at 511, and the old pipe was left near the excavation and was still there at 
the time of trial, R.3179 at 312, 509, 632; R.3181 at 697. In addition, by resolving the 
flooding problem, the drainage improvements dramatically changed the nature and 
accessability of the Property. R.3179 at 312; R.3181 at 698-700. 
Multiple witnesses, including Stahl, testified at trial that the trench and the 
backhoe used to excavate the trench were visible, and that the nature and accessability of 
the Property changed dramatically as a result of the drainage improvements. See R.3179 
at 625-627, 632-633 (Stahl); R.3179 at 514-515 (Chiniquy); R.3181 at 698 (Cloward). 
d. The wetlands delineations were visible and related to construction. 
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The wetlands delineations were visible and related to construction. The wetlands 
delineations were conducted in December 2000 and April 2001. R.3179 at 382-384; 393. 
As the trial court noted, the purpose of the delineations was to determine the presence of 
wetlands. R.2894 at 10 f 56. The delineations were related to construction because the 
project could not be built on or within ten feet of wetlands. R.3179 at 301-302. 
The wetlands delineations were also visible. Approximately 109 pin flags were 
placed on the Property to mark the wetlands delineations; these pin flags stood at least 15 
inches above the ground, and 51 of the 109 were also marked with 12-15 inch high rebar. 
R.3179 at 399, 404-407, 425-426; R.3179 at 300-301; R.3181 at 531, 408. 
While some of the pin flags may have been disturbed at times by animals grazing 
on the Property, multiple witnesses testified that these pin flags were visible over a period 
of several months, not only to someone inspecting the Property, but also from several of 
the roads bordering the Property. See R.3179 at 409, 524 (Chiniquy); R.3179 at 300-301 
(Safley); R.3181 at 694 (Cloward); R.3179 at 576 (Larson); R.3179 at 427, 462-463 
(Betts); R.3179 at 625 (Stahl). 
e. The groundwater monitoring was visible and related to 
construction. 
The groundwater monitoring was visible and related to construction. Eight to 
twelve groundwater monitoring wells were drilled in either December 2000 or March 
2001. R.3179 at 431-432; R.3179 at 516-518, 540-541, 627, 629, 635. As the trial court 
noted, the purpose of the groundwater monitoring was to test the water levels in the soil 
to determine the possible depth of the excavation for the buildings. R.2894 at 10-11 j^ 56. 
The groundwater monitoring was directly related to construction because the Property had 
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a groundwater problem that had to be monitored and addressed throughout the design and 
construction of the project. R.3179 at 648-649; R.3179 at 302-303. Because the water 
table was very shallow and the buildings for the development were designed to be set in 
the ground 12-14 feet, EDS A designed "extensive groundwater collection systems that 
extended around the buildings, under the foundations to intercept and collect all of the 
groundwater." R.3179 at 648, 650. In June 2001, Chiniquy also installed a metal weir to 
help measure the water flow volume on the Property. R.3179 at 440-441, 468, 526-527, 
551-552; R.3179 at 315. 
The groundwater monitoring wells were visible. Each well was three feet deep 
and required drilling by a two-man auger with an eight-inch bit. R.3179 at 432; R.3179 at 
516-517. Although the monitoring wells were backfilled, each well also had large, four-
inch wide, white PVC pipe sticking up above ground at least 12-18 inches but perhaps as 
much as two to three feet. R.3179 at 319, 423, 433, 517-518. Each monitoring well was 
also marked with an orange fluorescent flagged lath. R.3179 at 320, 435, 518-519. 
Multiple witnesses, including Chiniquy, Betts, Stahl, and Safley, testified that the 
monitoring wells were visible for a period of months, not only to someone inspecting the 
Property, but also from at least one of the roads bordering the Property. See R.3179 at 523 
(Chiniquy); R.3179 at 446 (Betts); R.3179 at 627 (Stahl); R.3179 at 320 (Safley). 
4. The Drainage Improvements Performed on the Property Should 
Not Be Excluded as "Ordinary Maintenance" 
Furthermore, the drainage improvements performed on the Property prior to the 
recording of the Zion's Trust Deed should not be excluded from the consideration of 
visible commencement of work as ''ordinary maintenance" - both because Utah case law 
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does not indicate that ordinary maintenance cannot constitute visible commencement of 
work as a matter of law, and because even if it did, the drainage improvements here were 
far more than "ordinary maintenance." 
Klibanoff relies on Calder Brothers for his assertion that ordinary maintenance can 
never constitute visible commencement of work. See Klibanoff Br. at 26-28. As this 
Court noted in Klibanoff, however, Calder Brothers does not stand for the proposition 
that, as a matter of law, "ordinary and necessary maintenance" or other repairs can never 
establish priority under § 38-1-5.6 Klibanoff 2005 UT App. at \ 22 (explaining that 
Calder Brothers held that "the record supported the trial court's factual determination that 
the work in that case did not provide adequate notice") (emphasis added). 
Even were ordinary maintenance excluded as a matter of law from visible 
commencement of work under § 38-1-5, the drainage improvements here were far more 
than ordinary maintenance or clean up work. Rather than merely "maintain" or "clean 
6
 In Calder Brothers, various contractors made improvements to the "Star Palace" 
in Provo in accordance with a set of plans submitted to the city after the recording of a 
mortgage. 652 P.2d at 923. Although none of the contractors had performed any work 
prior to the recording of the mortgage, the contractors argued that their liens should 
nevertheless have priority because, prior to the recording of the mortgage, the owner had 
"hired two young men on an hourly bases to help cut weeds, cut down two trees, and 
grout cracks in the building" and a painter to paint the building with paint supplied by an 
associate of the owner. Id. The Supreme Court of Utah noted that "[n]o mechanics' liens 
were filed as a result of any of [this] work" done prior to the recording of the mortgage. 
Id. 
Although the Court held that the work constituted "ordinary maintenance or 
cleanup work," the Court further explained that "[n]othing in the plans suggested that the 
painting and maintenance work was part of an improvement project envisioned by the 
new owners." Id. at 924. That is, there was no evidence that the "ordinary maintenance 
or cleanup work" was part of the planned improvements performed by the lien claimants. 
In fact, the Court noted that the painting was in fact rendered "valueless" by the 
subsequent improvements for which the mechanics' liens were sought. See id. at 925. 
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up" or "repair" an existing irrigation system, EDSA directed Chiniquy to dig ditches with 
a back hoe, repair existing irrigation ditches, remove the old existing irrigation pipe, and 
install 40 feet of new 15-inch PVC pipe. R. 823-826, 891, 912, 1266, 1236. Before 
installing the new PVC pipe, Chiniquy also excavated and improved the trench by putting 
in a base of rocks at the bottom and leveling the trench so that the new pipe would not 
have clogging problems. This leveling work, which the trial court did not address in its 
ruling, was an improvement because much of the problem with the old pipe resulted from 
the trench slope being uneven. R.3179 at 514. 
This drainage work was necessary, as discussed above, because of the surface 
water problem plaguing the Property. This drainage work was not performed in order to 
irrigate the Property, but was done in order to dry the land and make it habitable and fit 
for construction for the planned development. R.3179 at 370-371; see R.3181 at 697-698. 
Visible work constitutes an "improvement" if it is done with the intent and purpose of 
benefitting the project, Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713, 715 & n.3 (Utah App. 1988), and 
the drainage work here was performed in order to benefit the project. 
The drainage work performed by EDSA is unlike the insubstantial work performed 
in Calder Brothers, but rather, it is akin to the work performed in Zundel where the 
improvements made the land habitable. In Zundel, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
laying "water line and sewer pipe" alone was sufficient to establish priority under § 38-1-
5. See Zundel, 600 P.2d at 526. Similarly, EDSA's drainage improvements were part of 
the planned improvement and made the land habitable, and under Zundel, constitute 
commencement to do work under § 38-1-5. See id. at 525-26; R.3181 at 697-698 (the 
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new pipe was "an integral part of the intended [] permanent drainage plans" and "was 
implemented into the work that was continuing on or would have continued on"). The 
drainage improvements performed on the Property were far more than ordinary 
maintenance and therefore should not be excluded from the court's consideration of 
"visible commencement of work." 
B, Materials Were Furnished on the Property Prior to June 15. 2001 
Priority under § 38-1-5 can be established either by a visible commencement of 
work, or alternatively, by furnishing material on the ground. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5. 
Here, EDSA's lien is entitled to priority not only because visible work was commenced 
prior to the recording of the Zion's Trust Deed on June 15, 2001, but because materials 
were furnished on the Property prior to that date as well. These furnished materials 
included 40 feet of new 15-inch PVC pipe for the drainage improvements, additional 
PVC pipe for the groundwater monitoring, rebar, and a metal weir. See EDSA Br. at 32-
33; cf. Klibanoff Br. at 28 (falsely asserting that "EDSA admits that the only 'material' on 
the Property at any time prior to June 15, 2001 was the new 15 inch pipe"). 
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that under the mechanics' lien statute, 
"material or labor" need not be "furnished" solely "on a building structure." Zundel, 600 
P.2d at 525. Instead, § 38-1-5 should be broadly interpreted to cover work "which not 
only enhances the value of the developer's land, but is also necessary to make residences 
to be built on such property habitable." Id. There is no requirement under Utah law that 
the materials furnished on the ground be "construction materials" per se or that the 
materials actually be used or consumed in the improvement. See EDSA Br. at 38 n.9. 
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In any event, the 40 feet of new 15-inch PVC pipe used in the drainage 
improvements was necessary to the construction and design of the project. As discussed 
above, the drainage work was an "improvement" as that term is defined under Utah law, 
see Rotta, 756 P.2d at 715 & n.3, and this improvement enhanced the value of the 
Property and in fact was necessary to make the Property habitable for the development. 
All of the work performed by Chiniquy under EDSA's direction was done to dewater, 
drain, and dry out the Property to prepare it for construction. R. 3181 at 697-698. 
The weir was also necessary to the construction and design of the project and was 
installed in order to help measure the water flow volume on the Property. R.3179 at 440-
441, 468, 526-527, 551-552; R.3179 at 315. The weir would have remained on the 
Property throughout most of the construction and would not have been removed until the 
stream going through the development had been completed, which would have been one 
of the last items built. R.3179 at 292-293, 314; R.3179 at 376. 
In addition, another 20-60 feet of PVC pipe was furnished for the groundwater 
monitoring wells. R.3179 at 319, 433-434, 518. This PVC pipe was necessary to 
construction because the groundwater problem had to be monitored and addressed 
throughout the design and construction of the project. R.3179 at 302-303, 648-649. 
Rebar used in the control points and wetlands delineations was also furnished on 
site. R.3179 at 530-531; R.3179 at 299, 323-324. Furthermore, equipment rented and/or 
used on the Property included the tractor backhoe used in the drainage improvements, the 
drill rig used in the geotechnical study, and the two-man auger used in the groundwater 
monitoring. R.3179 at 295-297, 432, 507, 515, 571. 
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All of these materials were furnished on the Property prior to the recording of the 
Zion's Trust Deed on June 15, 2001, and thus EDSA's lien is entitled to priority over the 
Deed pursuant to § 38-1-5. 
C. EDSA Satisfied Its Responsibility to Marshal the Evidence 
In compliance with Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), EDSA marshaled the evidence in 
support of the trial court's factual findings. See EDSA Br. at 12-18. Nevertheless, 
Klibanoff asserts that EDSA failed to marshal the following facts: (1) the fact that EDSA 
did not produce a plan showing that the new irrigation pipe would be incorporated in the 
final construction of the project; (2) the fact that the orange netting was not installed on 
the Property until October 2001; (3) the fact that other status reports and Midway City 
meeting minutes indicated that "no construction" had begun; (4) the fact that holes were 
backfilled; (5) the fact that livestock were present on the Property; and (6) facts showing 
the amount of time spent working on the Property. See Klibanoff Br. at 14-16, 24-26. 
First, EDSA did not include in its Brief the fact that it did not introduce a plan 
showing that the drainage improvement was part of the overall construction because the 
undisputed evidence at trial was that the improvement was planned for full integration 
into the development at issue. Indeed, as testified to by Safley, part of the pipe that was 
installed by Chiniquy was incorporated into the final design of the project and would have 
been part of the finished project. Eventually, a stream was to be put in on the north end 
of the Property and the pipe would have been cut; although part of the pipe would be 
pulled out starting where the stream began, "a section of [the pipe]" that Chiniquy 
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installed would have remained in the ground for the final development. See R.3179 at 
371, 377-380. Thus, there was no need to marshal the evidence in this regard. 
Second, EDS A did not include in its brief the fact that the orange netting was 
installed until October 2001 because the orange netting was not a disputed issue of fact at 
trial. EDSA never contended at trial that the netting was installed prior to June 15, 2001. 
SeeR.3171 at 120-121. 
Third, since EDSA does not challenge the trial court's finding that no actual 
construction occurred prior to June 15, 2001, it is irrelevant whether EDSA identified all 
of the reports or meeting minutes which indicate that no actual construction occurred. In 
fact, EDSA agrees with the trial court that actual construction did not begin until after 
June 15, 2001. Instead, the main point of EDSA's appeal is that actual construction is not 
required for priority under § 38-1-5, and therefore, it was clear error for the trial court to 
base its conclusion that no "visible work" had commenced on the finding that no actual 
construction had occurred. See EDSA Br. at 33-35. 
Nevertheless, EDSA did marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
finding. In particular, EDSA identified Red Sea's development agreement with Midway, 
the preconstruction conference minutes, an April 2001 project status report prepared by 
Red Sea, and the trial testimony of multiple witnesses - all of which indicated that actual 
construction did not commence prior to June 15, 2001. EDSA Br. at 12-13. EDSA also 
noted that the trial court correctly found that prior to June 2001, the corners of the 
buildings and roads were not staked, the foundation holes were not excavated, and no 
buildings were constructed. Id. 
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Finally, contrary to Klibanoff s assertion, EDSA did identify evidence showing 
that the test holes and monitoring wells were backfilled. See EDSA Br. at 13-17. EDSA 
also identified evidence of the presence of livestock on the Property during this time 
period. See EDSA Br. at 18. Moreover, EDSA identified when the drainage 
improvements, surveys, wetlands delineations, geotechnical study, and groundwater 
monitoring occurred, as well as the length of time this work required. See EDSA Br. at 
12-18,24-31. 
EDSA satisfied its requirement to marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
court's factual findings. 
II. THE ASSIGNMENT OF J.M. WILLIAMS' LIEN TO EDSA WAS VALID 
The various legal impediments raised to defeat J.M. Williams' claim are without 
merit, and the trial court erred in holding that the assignment of J.M Williams' lien 
interest to EDSA was not valid. Despite a contractual provision prohibiting assignment 
of the contract, J.M. Williams was free to assign its lien claim because at the time of the 
assignment, Red Sea had breached the Contracts. R.3177 at 73-74. A clause prohibiting 
the assignment of a contract does not also prevent the assignment of a cause of action for 
a breach of the contract. Fuller v. Favorite Theaters Co., 230 P.2d 335, 336 (Utah 1951). 
While it is true that "where a contract expressly states that the right to sue for 
breach of contract is non-assignable, full force and effect must be given to such 
provision," SME Indus, v. Thompson, 2001 UT 54, ^ | 12, 28 P.3d 669, there was no such 
express prohibition in either J.M. Williams' February or October Contracts with Red Sea. 
Rather, the Contracts simply prohibited the assignment of "interest in this Agreement," 
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and this general prohibition cannot be construed as a prohibition on the assignment of 
rights (including the right to receive payment) under the Contract. See EDSA Br. at 39 
n.10. Thus, despite this clause, J.M. Williams could assign its breach of contract claim 
and its rights, including the right to receive payment, under the Contracts. 
The assignment of J.M. Williams' lien was also supported by adequate 
consideration because while J.M. Williams received the benefit of having-EDSA pay the 
legal fees and pursuing the claim on its behalf, EDSA received the benefit of maintaining 
a long-standing and important business relationship. See R.3179 at 669; DeMentas v. 
Estate ofTallas, 764 P.2d 628, 632 (Utah App. 1988) (stating that consideration exists 
whenever a legal detriment is bargained for, and that any detriment, no matter how 
economically inadequate, will support a promise). 
J.M. Williams' lien claim is also effective under § 38-1-7. Utah Code Ann. § 38-
1-26 allows an assignee to commence and prosecute actions in its own name, and thus, 
EDSA was free to pursue J.M. Williams' assigned lien claim in its own name. Even 
assuming arguendo that § 38-1-7 and § 38-1-26 did require that the lien notice list J.M. 
Williams' name and address as a lien claimant, the error should not defeat the lien 
because Klibanoff did not assert - either at trial or in his brief- that he was misled or 
suffered any prejudice by the failure to include this information. See Klibanoff Br. at 34-
36; Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 747 (Utah 
1990) (finding substantial compliance satisfies lien notice statute unless defects in lien 
have misled or prejudiced other parties). 
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Finally, the mechanics' lien was timely as to J.M. Williams' interests. Both 
Williams and Forrest testified that they contemplated that J.M. Williams would perform 
work, including site visits and inspections as noted in the cover letter to the February 
Contract, during the construction phase, and that as a result, the Contracts had not been 
fully completed as of November 8, 2002. See, e.g. R.317 at 75-77. The assignment of 
J.M. Williams' lien to EDSA was valid. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
The trial court's ruling on attorneys' fees constitutes an abuse of discretion. First, 
EDSA should be deemed a "successful party" because it obtained judgments against two 
of the defendants, Red Sea and the Homestead Lodge, on its first and third causes of 
action, and because it prevailed in the first and second phases of this case when this Court 
reversed the Order granting summary judgment to Klibanoff. See Klibanoff, 2005 UT 
App 367; see also ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, lj 32, 998 P.2d 254 
(indicating that parties who are successful in an appeal that arose out of a cause of action 
under a mechanic's lien is entitled to the attorneys fees on appeal); Richards v. Security 
Pac. Natl Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 612 (Utah App. 1993) (indicating that appeals from 
actions brought to enforce a lien qualifies as part of wCan action"). Therefore, at a 
minimum, EDSA was a successful party during the first and second phases of the case, 
and applying the flexible and reasoned approach of A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, 94 P.3d 270, dictates that Klibanoff should be denied 
attorneys' fees associated with this case up to September 1, 2005. 
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Second, the HJ&S Affidavit fails to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 73. See 
Klibanoff Br. at 43-44 (failing to address the issue of the HJ&S Affidavit). The HJ&S 
Affidavit is completely devoid of evidence about the reasonableness of the billing rates at 
HJ&S and the relation of those rates to rates in the relevant legal community, as well as 
evidentiary justification for the amount of work performed and charged by the attorneys. 
See EDS A Br. at 46-47 & n.13. The HJ&S Affidavit is also simply wrong in setting forth 
certain billing entries. See id. There is no evidence from which the trial court could have 
determined that $27,473.20 is a reasonable amount of fees based on the HJ&S Affidavit. 
Third, the amount of attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to the PB&L Affidavit is 
unreasonable. PB&L billed for approximately $144,444 during the trial and post-trial 
phase of this case, despite the fact that this was only a 2 Vi day bench trial with a limited 
number of witnesses and only one round of post-trial briefing. Moreover, PB&L billed 
for two partners and a paralegal to appear at trial when there is no evidence that two 
partner-level attorneys were needed to try this case; PB&L also billed for two partners 
and an associate to work on the researching, drafting, and revising of the post-trial brief 
and the proposed findings of fact. While this time and level of effort may have been 
approved by PB&L's client, it is unreasonable for purposes of § 38-1-18(1) and Utah R. 
Civ. P. 73(b). 
Finally, to the extent that Klibanoff s award of attorneys' fees is upheld, such fees 
should be apportioned among various defendants. At the time of PB&L's involvement in 
this case, there were four lien claimants that had asserted or recorded mechanics' liens 
and other claims against the Property, including EDSA, the Jack Johnson Company, R/C 
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Engineering, Inc., and Ray Quinney & Nebeker. As a matter of law, this Court should 
apportion the award among these four lien claimants on an equal basis. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests the Court to reverse the 
trial court's July 28, 2006 Ruling and subsequent Order, and its February 27, 2007 Ruling 
on attorneys' fees and costs and subsequent Order. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 2007. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Richard 
Rachel A. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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